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Abstract 
In this paper, we investigate the effect of voluntary carbon emissions disclosure on the cost of 
debt of publicly listed firms. Using a unique and comprehensive database on carbon emissions 
from CDP (formerly „The Carbon Disclosure Project‟), we study whether firms which choose 
to voluntarily disclose their carbon emissions enjoy more favorable lending conditions – in 
the form of lower spreads on their bank loans – than their non-disclosing counterparts. Our 
empirical results reveal a significant and negative relation between voluntarily disclosing 
carbon emission levels and the cost of bank loans for informationally opaque borrowers. 
Furthermore, we find that higher industry- and firm-size-adjusted carbon emissions have a 
positive and significant effect on loan spreads. These effects are common to all loans and not 
limited to loans which have been arranged by norms-constrained lenders suggesting that 
spread premia are driven by environmental risks rather than investor preferences.  
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1 Introduction 
One of the leading questions in the environmental economics and financial economics 
literatures over the last decade has been whether capital markets pick up and price extra-
financial information on environmental, social, and governance issues (ESG), which provides 
information on potential investee companies that go above and beyond the standard financial 
information such as accounting information of balance sheets and income statements. Usually, 
this extra-financial information is considered to be a three-dimensional framework, which 
comprises information about the environmental (E), social (S), and governance (G) 
performance of companies that investors can invest in.  
Up till now, there is a plethora of literature investigating the different facets of ESG 
and their influence on the financial performance of companies, their operational performance, 
or their cost of capital. In this paper, we focus on the environmental dimension of the ESG 
universe. More precisely, we study whether the conscious decision taken by companies to 
voluntarily disclose their carbon emissions and the level thereof are related to the company‟s 
interest costs (i.e., loan spreads) that these companies have to pay on their bank loans. Stated 
differently, we research the relation between the carbon emissions and the company‟s cost of 
debt. To do so, our analysis is split into two distinct parts. First, we investigate the effect of 
voluntarily disclosing carbon emissions and the loan spread a company has to pay. Second, 
we examine the effect of the actually revealed emissions levels on a company‟s loan spread.  
The results of our empirical analyses can be summarized as follows. We find that 
informational opaque firms which choose to voluntarily reveal their carbon emissions pay 
significantly lower spreads on their bank loans, as compared to their non-disclosing 
counterparts. Regarding the absolute emission levels, we find that firms with relatively more 
carbon emissions pay higher spreads on their loans. Both effects exist for all bank loans and 
are not driven by the fact whether so-called norms-constrained lenders are among the lead 
arrangers for the bank loans. Hence, our results imply that firms should be aware that 
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voluntary emissions disclosure and the corresponding emission levels affect their cost of debt. 
Similarly, our results also have implications for firms that have relatively higher emission 
levels or firms that have little managerial control over their emissions and therefore might 
have to pay higher cost of debt: according to our results, carbon emissions could be 
considered as an additional risk factor that banks take into account (i.e., either directly or 
indirectly), when assessing the creditworthiness of a borrower. 
The timeliness and importance of our study is not to be understated, especially against 
the backdrop of the ongoing debates about climate change and pollution, and the recently 
signed Paris Agreement of the COP21. Countries pledged to undertake actions in order to 
limit the global warming to a maximum of 1.5 degrees Celsius. These actions will also 
influence companies and their operations, be it through the immediate introduction of new 
environmental regulations to limit carbon emissions, or through the introduction of an explicit 
carbon price which would impose a huge cost fact on companies. Ultimately, these actions 
impose additional risks on companies, especially on those companies operating in 
environmental sensitive industries such as fossil fuel, mining, or oil and gas industries. 
Alongside these recent political and legislative developments, there also is an ongoing 
academic discussion regarding the influence of ESG information on companies and 
corresponding investment decisions by the financial industry. Nowadays, there is convincing 
evidence that companies with better ESG practices do not perform worse than companies with 
bad ESG practices. Rather the contrary has been documented in the existing literature: Good 
ESG practices can lead to better financial performance and lower cost of capital for 
companies (see, for example, Friede, Busch, and Bassen, 2015 and Clark, Feiner, and Viehs, 
2015). There is also evidence that the environmental performance of companies has a direct 
effect on a company‟s cost of equity and cost debt (see, for example, Chava, 2014). 
Despite this growing evidence, we add significantly to various streams of the existing 
literature and also provide financial market participants with new and important implications 
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and recommendations. First, we add to the voluntary disclosure literature by investigating the 
effect of increasing transparency from corporations with respect to their environmental 
performance. We argue that by voluntarily disclosing their carbon emissions, companies can 
reduce information asymmetries and uncertainties vis-à-vis their capital providers and thus 
reduce their cost of capital. This argument is based on the theoretical arguments put forward 
in Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) as well as Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2007).  
Second, we add to the responsible investment literature that documents the influence 
of norms-constrained investors on the cost of capital of corporations. On the one hand, 
institutional investors with certain norms and moral beliefs might eschew potential investee 
firms because of the industry they are operating in (particularly the so-called “sin” industries 
such as tobacco, alcohol, or military defense). On the other hand, norms-unconstrained 
institutional investors could remain keen to invest in such firms but may demand a higher 
price or return for the capital provided. In this study, we investigate whether norms-
constrained lenders have an effect on a firm‟s cost of debt by charging a risk premium in case 
of poor environmental performance (i.e., higher carbon emission levels), assuming the lenders 
are being especially interested in the environmental performance of their borroerws. This 
reasoning is similar to the arguments in Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), Heinkel, Kraus, and 
Zechner (2001), and Gollier and Pouget (2012).  
Third, we also add to the investment literature which documents that firms with better 
ESG practices generally have a significantly lower cost of capital because they are better 
prepared for adverse effects that could arise from severe environmental, social, or governance 
events (which might change the risk profile of a firm). Thus, firms with, for example, better 
environmental safety standards or better environmental management practices have lower 
costs of capital. Sharfman and Fernando (2008), Chava (2014), and Goss and Roberts (2011) 
show that corporations with good ESG practices tend to have significantly lower costs of debt 
capital. We investigate if banks price the risks inherent in poor environmental performance 
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such as litigation or reputation risks as part of the firm‟s credit risk. If that reasoning is 
correct, lenders will charge higher interest rates for borrowers which display a relatively 
worse environmental performance. 
We add to these streams of literature by investigating the effect of carbon disclosure 
and actual carbon emission levels on a corporation‟s cost of debt financing. We concentrate 
on the corporation‟s cost of bank debt and are able identify different investor types, i.e. 
lenders who are environmentally norms-constrained and those who are not. This allows us to 
differentiate two types of cost of debt effects: effects of carbon disclosure that are present for 
all lenders and thus suggest the presence of an environmental risk premium; versus effects of 
carbon disclosure that are only present for norms-constrained lenders and thus suggest the 
presence of investor preferences.  
Our study is unique in a number of ways. First, we extend the literature by measuring 
the impacts of voluntarily reporting carbon emissions and carbon emission levels on firm‟s 
cost of capital. That is, we take a direct environmental performance measure (i.e., the absolute 
carbon emission level reported) rather than an indirect measure (e.g., an environmental rating) 
which is usually taken in existing studies to proxy for the environmental performance of a 
company. Second, we use a global sample of firms. More specifically, we look at companies 
that are domiciling in 58 different countries. This global approach makes our study very 
distinctive from existing ones, which usually focus on the US market. Finally and as 
mentioned before, we are able to clearly differentiate whether investor preferences or 
environmental risks drive the differences in loan spreads.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our 
research hypotheses in relation to the existing literature. This is followed by section 3, where 
we explain and describe the data sources and present our empirical method that we adopt in 
this paper. Then, in section 4, we present our main empirical findings and the results from our 
robustness check. Finally, we conclude in section 5. 
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2 Related literature and research hypotheses  
The main research question of our paper is: “What are the effects of voluntary carbon 
emissions disclosure and actual carbon emission levels on the loan spreads that companies 
have to pay on their outstanding bank loans?”. We answer this research question using three 
main hypotheses which we derive now from the existing literature. 
The corporate finance and accounting literatures both show that better information 
disclosure by corporations generally results in a lower cost of capital because of reduced 
information asymmetries and uncertainties (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991 and Lambert, 
Leuz, and Verrecchia, 2007). These findings have been supported and even reinforced by 
review studies such as Armstrong, Guay, and Weber (2010) and Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and 
Walther (2010). The general evidence on the effects of voluntary disclosure on companies 
points to the conclusion that disclosing information to financial markets reduces a company‟s 
informational opaqueness. Voluntarily revealing material information to market participants 
can have three major effects on companies and their issued securities. First, it can reduce 
information asymmetries between firms and capital providers. Second, firms can use 
voluntary disclosure of relevant information (and the resulting lower information uncertainty) 
to increase investor demand for their securities. And third, firms can increase the market 
liquidity of their securities by disclosing more information. Ultimately, these arguments imply 
that more disclosure by corporations leads to a reduced cost of capital. Thus, we argue that 
those firms which voluntarily opt for reporting and revealing their carbon emissions have a 
reduced cost of debt capital, because lenders value the higher transparency of corporations 
irrespective of whether norms-constrained lenders are amongst the lead arrangers in the loan 
syndicate. Hence, we posit our Voluntary Disclosure Hypothesis (VDH) as: 
VDH: CO2 emissions disclosure is negatively associated with corporations’ costs of debt. 
We also focus in this paper on the relationship between actual corporate 
environmental performance (measured through actual carbon emission levels) and the costs of 
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bank debt. The general argument in the literature is that superior ESG practices help reduce 
the risk for companies that arise from potential externalities. For example, Godfrey, Merrill, 
and Hansen (2009) argue that superior CSR activities act as an insurance against adverse ESG 
events if these activities are designed to serve secondary stakeholders and society in general. 
That is, if corporations implement reasonable ESG policies, they might not be as severely 
affected by environmental disasters, or newly introduced regulations regarding climate 
change, as corporations which have relatively weaker ESG standards in place. Similar 
arguments have been put forward by Chava (2014) as well as Bauer and Hann (2010), who 
also stress the lower reputational and litigation risk that superior ESG standards carry with 
them. Both studies show that companies with better environmental management systems in 
place and hence, better environmental ratings, do have to pay significantly lower costs on 
their bank loans and have better credit ratings. This in turn implies that more sustainable 
companies, in terms of environmental performance (i.e., in our paper context these are 
companies with relatively lower carbon emission levels), have lower credit risk than their less 
sustainable peers because of, for example, a reduced volatility of future earnings or an 
improved competitive position of firms vis-à-vis less sustainable counterparts. In the context 
of our paper, this implies that lenders might take the environmental performance of borrowers 
into account when assessing the creditworthiness of firms. Consequently, firms with a poor 
environmental performance should pay higher interest rates on their bank loans. This 
argument is tested using the Risk Mitigation Hypothesis (RMH): 
RMH: The actual amount of industry- and firm size-adjusted CO2 emissions by the borrower 
is positively associated with the cost of debt. 
If we were to find evidence in favor of the risk-mitigation hypothesis (RMH), our 
results should hold true for all borrowers – irrespective of whether norms-constrained lenders 
are involved in the loan syndicate or not. However, it could then also be the case that a 
potential positive association of carbon emissions and the cost of debt is driven by those loans 
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that have been initiated by norms-constrained lenders which pay particular attention towards 
the carbon emission levels of their borrowers. In the spirit of Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner 
(2001), Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) and Gollier and Pouget (2012), we therefore 
hypothesize that environmentally norms-constrained investors are especially concerned about 
the environmental performance of the firms they lend to or invest in. To assess whether 
norms-constrained lenders take carbon emissions into consideration when they price loans to 
corporations, we test our third research hypothesis, the Investor Preference Hypothesis (IPH): 
IPH: The rise in the cost of bank debt is driven by those loans which have norms-constrained 
lenders among the loan’s lead arrangers. 
Using the three aforementioned research hypotheses, we are going to answer the main 
research question of our paper and provide the literature and the financial services industry 
with unique evidence on the association of carbon disclosure and carbon emission levels with 
a company‟s cost of bank capital. 
3 Data 
3.1  Data sources 
The data for our analyses come from two main sources: CDP (formerly known as the 
„Carbon Disclosure Project‟) and DealScan. We use CDP to (1) obtain firm-specific data on 
environmental disclosure and carbon emissions and (2) classify those institutional investors 
who are signatories to CDP as environmentally norms-constrained investors. We use 
DealScan to collect information about corporate loans including loan spreads and the identity 
of the loan‟s lead arrangers. By matching lead arrangers to CDP‟s signatories, we are able to 
identify those loans that are arranged by norms-constrained arrangers. Hence, our dataset is 
different to existing ones and provides us with the unique opportunity to directly observe the 
presence of norms-constrained investors on the loan level and match it to the environmental 
performance of a specific borrower.  
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CDP is a UK-based not-for-profit organization that aims to “use the power of 
measurement and information disclosure to improve the management of environmental risk” 
(CDP, 2015a). To achieve this goal, CDP targets companies with an annual survey concerning 
their carbon emissions, investments into climate change and environmental management 
techniques. Between 2002 and 2013, CDP‟s outreach has increased from the UK‟s FTSE500 
firms to about 1,200 firms worldwide. While CDP typically sends the questionnaire to those 
firms which have publically traded equity, the companies are typically constituents of the 
major stock market indices such as FTSE Global Equity Index Series – All Cap, FTSE All-
World Developed – Large Cap, S&P/IFCI Large/Mid Emerging Market Index, as well as 
specific industrial sectors such as electricity, fossil fuels, and transportation.
2
 
For all companies that are targeted by CDP, we categorize their responses to the 
annual questionnaire into one of three groups: (1) disclosure (the targeted firm answers the 
questionnaire); (2) no response (CDP does not receive any response from the targeted firm); 
and (3) declined to participate (the targeted firm informs CDP that it does not wish to 
complete the questionnaire).
3
 In the context of our Voluntary Disclosure Hypothesis, we 
consider only firms belonging to the first group to be those firms who voluntarily disclose 
environmental information. The firm‟s annual carbon emissions are part of the information 
contained in the questionnaire responses and we use this information to test our Risk 
Mitigation and Investor Preference Hypotheses.  
In 2015, CDP is backed by more than 822 signatories, including institutional investors 
with a combined asset base of more than US$ 95 trillion. As signatories, these investors have 
access to all information provided by targeted corporations in the responses to CDP annual 
questionnaire.
4
 In return, the signatories support CDP “through endorsement of our annual 
questionnaires” to their investee firms (CDP, 2015b). We assume that those financial 
                                                          
2
 A full list of firms participating in the 2014 Climate Change Program can be found here: 
https://www.cdp.net/Documents/Guidance/2014/companies-requested-to-respond-cdp-climate-change-2014.pdf 
3
 In the empirical analyses of this paper, we treat the category “decline” as the base case. 
4
 For a full list of CDP signatories see https://www.cdp.net/en-US/Programmes/Pages/Sig-Investor-List.aspx. 
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institutions which become CDP signatories are especially concerned about the environmental 
performance of the firms they lend to or invest in. Therefore, we consider lenders who are 
signatories to CDP to be norms-constrained arrangers with respect to the environment, as in 
the spirit of Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner (2001) and Hong and Kacperczyk (2009). 
Identifying signatories among the borrower‟s debtholders thus allows us to test our Investor 
Preference Hypothesis. 
Our second main data source is Thomson Reuters‟ LPC DealScan database. DealScan 
contains information about bilateral and syndicated loans signed since 1987 by private and 
public borrowers worldwide. Of particular interest for our study is each loan‟s spread and 
syndicate structure. The former constitutes our measure of the firm‟s cost of debt. The latter 
allows us to identify CDP signatories among each loan‟s lead arrangers. The DealScan 
database also contains information on loan characteristics such as: signing date; size; 
maturity; pricing details (including base rate and performance pricing); financial covenants; 
tranching; purpose; type; and security or seniority. Furthermore, the borrower‟s industry, 
country and credit rating are included. 
To analyze the effect of carbon emissions disclosure on the cost of bank loans for 
corporations, we merge the entire CDP database from 2007-2013 with Thomson Reuters‟ 
LPC DealScan database. In particular, we match firms targeted by CDP and CDP signatories 
with DealScan‟s borrowers and lead arrangers, respectively. As CDP exclusively targets firms 
which have publicly traded securities outstanding, we include loans to all such public 
borrowers. Our sample therefore includes not only loans to borrowers who actually received a 
questionnaire from CDP but also loans to borrowers that could potentially have received a 
questionnaire. We identify public borrowers by the fact that they have a corporate identifier 
(GVK) available in Compustat North America or Compustat Global or an ISIN in 
Worldscope. We only consider borrowers from countries in which CDP targeted at least one 
borrower between 2007 and 2013. Consequently, our sample consists of loans to firms 
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targeted by CDP and control firms. In this way, we are able to control for any potential 
selection effects in case that firms targeted by CDP differ from the general population of 
public corporate borrowers. Due to the more comprehensive coverage of non-US firms in 
Worldscope, we collect financial statement data for all borrowers from Worldscope including 
the borrower‟s total assets, ROA, and leverage. 
3.2  Methodology 
To test our Voluntary Disclosure Hypothesis, we adopt a standard ordinary least 
squares framework where we regress the natural logarithm of the loan spread in basis points 
(bps) on a set of explanatory variables as shown in regression 1: 
 
 (1) 
 
CDP target equals one if CDP targeted the borrower with a questionnaire and zero otherwise.
5
 
Response to CDP questionnaire is a vector of dummy variables reflecting the borrower‟s 
response to the questionnaire including Disclosure, No response, and Decline. X is a vector of 
control variables related to loan, borrower, country and time characteristics. In various 
specifications of our empirical model, this vector also controls for the fact whether norms-
constrained arrangers (NCA) are participating in the loan syndicate. Loan-level controls 
include loan size and maturity, dummies for the presence of performance pricing, financial 
covenants, multiple base rates and deals consisting of multiple tranches as well as groups of 
dummy variables for each loan purpose, type, security, and seniority level. Borrower controls 
include dummies for borrower credit rating, industry, and country. Finally, we include time 
dummies reflecting the year of loan signing.
6
 For the Voluntary Disclosure Hypothesis, the 
coefficients of interest are included in a2. The null hypothesis is that a2 equals zero. In 
                                                          
5
 CDP sends out its annual questionnaire in February and firms typically reply by June. Thus, their answers refer 
to the situation in the previous year, i.e., t-1. We therefore match questionnaires sent out in year t with loans 
signed in year t. We treat CDP signatory status in the same way.  
6
 See Table A1 in the Appendix for a detailed description of all variables. 
𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 =  𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐶𝐷𝑃 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡 
+ 𝑎2𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐶𝐷𝑃 𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑒 + 𝑎3𝑋 + 𝜀     
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contrast, we expect a negative coefficient for loans to disclosing borrowers. As mentioned 
before, in some specifications, we add a Norms constrained arranger (NCA) dummy and an 
interaction effect with the company‟s response to the questionnaire, in order to investigate 
whether any spread effect is common to all banks or limited to norms-constrained banks. NCA 
equals one if at least one of the loan‟s lead arrangers is a CDP signatory and zero otherwise.7 
The regression sample for which these proxies are available consists of 17,643 loans signed 
between 2007 and 2013. As borrowers can be included in the sample with multiple loans, 
standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered on the borrower level.  
As shown in regression (2), we apply a similar regression framework to test our Risk 
Mitigation and Investor Preference Hypotheses: 
 
 (2) 
 
CO2 measures industry- and firm-size-adjusted carbon emissions, arising either in form of 
Scope 1 or Scope 2 type of emissions. NCA and our vector of control variables X are defined 
as in regression (1). The differentiation between Scope 1 and Scope 2 emission levels has 
been introduced by the Greenhouse Gas Protocol and has become a widely recognized 
standard for the measurement of CO2 emissions.
8
 For the Risk Mitigation and Investor 
                                                          
7
 In some of the empirical specifications in which we analyse the effect of the actual amounts of carbon 
emissions on the loan spread, we define NCA differently. In Table 3, we define NCA in some specifications as 
the fraction of CDP signatories among the loan‟s arrangers.  
8
 The Greenhouse Gas Protocol (GHG Protocol) specifies the use of so-called Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions. 
According to GHG Protocol, Scope 1 emissions are all direct GHG emissions: “Direct GHG emissions occur 
from sources that are owned or controlled by the company, for example, emissions from combustion in owned or 
controlled boilers, furnaces, vehicles, etc.; emissions from chemical production in owned or controlled process 
equipment”. On the other hand, Scope 2 emissions are all Electricity indirect GHG emissions: “Scope 2 accounts 
for GHG emissions from the generation of purchased electricity consumed by the company. Purchased electricity 
is defined as electricity that is purchased or otherwise brought into the organizational boundary of the company. 
Scope 2 emissions physically occur at the facility where electricity is generated”. We stick to GHG because this 
is also the standard applied by CDP: “The Greenhouse Gas Protocol (GHG Protocol) is the most widely used 
international accounting tool for government and business leaders to understand, quantify, and manage 
greenhouse gas emissions. The GHG Protocol, a decade-long partnership between the World Resources Institute 
and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, is working with businesses, governments, and 
environmental groups around the world to build a new generation of credible and effective programs for tackling 
climate change” (GHG Protocol, 2014). 
𝑙𝑛 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 =  𝑏0 + 𝑏1𝐶𝑂2 + 𝑏2𝑁𝐶𝐴 + 𝑏3𝐶𝑂2 ∗𝑁𝐶𝐴 
+ 𝑏4𝑋 + 𝜀     
13 
 
Preference Hypotheses, the coefficients of interest are b1 and b3. For the Risk Mitigation 
Hypothesis, the null hypothesis is that b1 and b3 equal zero while we expect a positive 
coefficient for b1 in combination with a zero coefficient for b3 indicating that loans to 
borrowers with higher carbon emissions are priced at a higher spread by all lenders. For the 
Investor Preference Hypothesis, the null hypothesis is that b1 and b3 equal zero while we 
expect a zero coefficient for b1 in combination with a positive coefficient for b3 indicating that 
loans to borrowers with higher carbon emissions are priced at a higher spread only by norms-
constrained lenders. The regression sample for which these proxies are available consists of 
1,600 loans signed between 2007 and 2013. In contrast to the sample for regression (1), we 
are now focusing only on loans to borrowers that are targeted by CDP with a questionnaire 
and disclose carbon emission levels.
9
 
3.3  Unconditional loan spreads 
Figure 1 presents the unconditional spreads for our sample of 17,643 loans. The 
average spread for all public borrowers is 238 bps. However, differentiating between those 
publicly listed firms which received the CDP questionnaire to disclose their carbon emissions 
and those publicly listed firms which were not invited by CDP to participate, reveals the first 
evidence in favor of our Voluntary Disclosure Hypothesis: companies that receive the 
questionnaire have to pay a substantial lower spread (176 bps) than the firms which do not 
receive it (262 bps). One explanation for this finding could be that CDP is targeting the 
supposedly larger, more mature firms which have to pay lower spreads because of their 
specific corporate performance and firm characteristics which are not necessarily related with 
the carbon disclosure question. Hence, this finding strongly indicates the need to control for 
firm characteristics. Finally, Figure 1 illustrates the average spreads depending on the firm‟s 
response to the CDP questionnaire. Borrowers that answered the questionnaire, i.e. borrowers 
who disclose, pay the lowest loan spread of 164 bps amongst the three different response 
                                                          
9
 Table A2 in the Appendix provides descriptive statistics for both regression samples. 
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groups. Companies that do not respond pay a higher loan spreads, namely 197 bps. The 
highest loan spreads, however, pay firms that actively declined to participate in the CDP 
survey. These borrowers have to pay on average a spread of 203 bps. 
**** Insert Figure 1 about here **** 
These unconditional descriptive statistics for the loan spreads allude to the fact that 
less environmentally transparent firms have to pay substantially higher loan spreads, whereas 
more environmentally transparent firms enjoy more favorable lending conditions. However, 
we have to be careful with making any causal inferences from these unconditional results as it 
could be well the case that our sample is suffering from a sample selection bias, namely that 
only the largest and best performing firms regarding carbon emissions are targeted by CDP 
which might affect the observed loan spreads.   
4 Results 
4.1  Evidence on the Voluntary Disclosure Hypothesis 
Table 1 presents the baseline results for our Voluntary Disclosure Hypothesis. The 
negative and significant coefficient of our CDP target proxy in Model 1 reveals that 
borrowers targeted by CDP with a questionnaire pay significantly lower spreads on their bank 
loans than non-targeted borrowers. In itself, this result indicates that even after controlling for 
borrower, loan, country and time characteristics, firms targeted by CDP are still substantially 
different from other borrowers due to some unobserved characteristics. However, the results 
of Model 2 refute this interpretation. In this model, we add our binary variables indicating the 
borrower‟s response to the questionnaire. As mentioned before, we differentiate between three 
different response alternatives: disclosure, no response, and declining to participate, whereas 
the latter category is the base case in all of our analyses. We find a nonsignificant coefficient 
for CDP targets but a negative and significant coefficient for disclosing borrowers. This 
indicates that the negative effect of receiving the questionnaire documented in Model 1 is 
fully explained by firms that answer the questionnaire. Hence, we can conclude that it is not a 
15 
 
question of receiving the questionnaire (i.e., the selection of target firms by CDP) that 
negatively influences the loan spread. Instead, it is the actual act of answering CDP‟s 
questionnaire that matters: the full disclosure coefficient confirms our Voluntary Disclosure 
Hypothesis and our results are statistically as well as economically significant.  
The economic size of this observed statistical relationship is also worth being pointed 
out. The interpretation goes as follows. The average loan size in the underlying sample of 
Model 2 is US$ 497 million and the average spread margin across all loans in the sample is 
238 bps. Hence, the spread for an average firm amounts to US$ 11.8 million (US$ 497 
million x 2.38%) per annum. The coefficient of -0.11 on the full disclosure variable implies 
that the percentage difference in the loan spread between firms that disclose environmental 
information and those that do not equals -10% [= 100 x (exp
-0.11
)-1)]. Hence, all else equal, 
the economic interpretation of this result implies that disclosing firms save, on average, 
interest costs to the amount of US$ 1.2 million per annum. Thus, our empirical results are not 
only statistical meaningful, they also carry huge economic implications with them. Moreover, 
the coefficients of the remaining control variables are in line with the empirical loan pricing 
literature which strengthens the robustness of our results even further. 
**** Insert Table 1 about here **** 
As the disclosure coefficient in Model 2 is significant only at the 10% level, we provide 
additional evidence regarding the Voluntary Disclosure Hypothesis in Models 3 to 5 of Table 
1. To begin with, we consider different levels of information asymmetry between borrower 
and lender in Model 3 of Table 1 because it has been shown that the level of information 
asymmetry is an important determinant of loan spreads and credit risk (see, for example, 
Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). That is, we investigate whether disclosing environmental 
information through CDP has the potential to reduce the informational opaqueness that 
several companies are suffering from because they are assessed as being relatively 
nontransparent with respect to investor-relevant information. To test this, we identify opaque 
16 
 
borrowers as borrowers that lack a credit rating or financial statement information and interact 
this information with the binary variable which identifies the disclosure of relevant carbon 
information through CDP. The significant and negative interaction term of -0.12 in Model 3 
indicates that increased transparency in form of environmental disclosure is associated with 
lower spreads for opaque borrowers. In contrast, the coefficient of the standalone disclosure 
variable is now insignificant indicating that transparent borrowers do not benefit from 
environmental disclosure. Thus, our Voluntary Disclosure Hypothesis applies only to opaque 
borrowers with an economic relevance similar to the one reported for Model 2.  
Next, we consider the relevance of norms-constrained investors. As our Voluntary 
Disclosure Hypothesis is motivated on the basis on information asymmetry and uncertainty, 
we do not expect NCAs to behave differently from unconstrained arrangers. Instead, we 
expect both groups to price information uncertainty with a similar economic and statistical 
magnitude. The results of Model 4 confirm our expectation as the coefficients of our NCA 
dummy and its interaction term are both insignificant. Finally, we replicate our main results of 
Model 3 for the sub-sample of borrowers targeted by CDP with a questionnaire. The results of 
this analysis are presented in Model 5 and are consistent with our previously documented 
results.  
In sum, the results presented in Table 1 support our Voluntary Disclosure Hypothesis 
and indicate that voluntary disclosure of environmental information is economically valuable 
to borrowers with a high level of information uncertainty in the form of interest cost savings 
of up to $1.2 million annually. 
4.2  Evidence on the Risk Mitigation and Investor Preference Hypotheses 
We now turn to the question whether the absolute carbon emission levels are 
influencing the loan spreads, at least for those companies that opt to report their carbon 
performance through CDP. Starting with some unconditional findings about the level of 
carbon emissions, Figure 2 shows the mean and median emissions by industry. These 
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statistics are entirely based on all firms with full disclosure.
10
 Not surprisingly, both Scope 1 
and Scope 2 emissions vary greatly by industry. The highest Scope 1 carbon emissions, e.g. 
the direct emissions generated by the firm, can be found in primary metals manufacturing, 
petroleum refining and transportation sectors. Levels of Scope 2 carbon emissions, e.g. 
indirect emissions from electricity purchase in the supply chain, are substantially smaller but 
also vary greatly across industry – the highest emissions being found in the primary metals 
manufacturing and trade sectors.  
These industry variations have clear implications for our measurement of firm-level 
emissions. In the analyses that follow, we adjust the reported carbon emissions in the 
following manner. First, we scale the level of carbon emissions in metric tons by the firm‟s 
amount of total assets in US dollars to arrive at a measure for a company‟s carbon intensity. 
Second, we adjust this metric by the median industry-level of carbon emissions.  
**** Insert Figure 2 about here **** 
Tables 2 and 3 document our evidence regarding the Risk Mitigation and Investor 
Preference Hypotheses, respectively. First, we investigate the Risk Mitigation Hypothesis. In 
Table 2, Models 1-3 investigate the relationship between Scope 1 carbon emissions, Scope 2 
carbon emissions and the total of Scope 1 and 2 carbon emissions and a borrower‟s loan 
spread, respectively. In all three models, the coefficient of carbon emissions on loan spreads is 
positive and significant thus providing initial support for our Risk Mitigation Hypothesis.  
Turning to the economic interpretation of our results depicted in Table 2, we also find 
very meaningful results: For a one standard deviation increase in Scope 1 carbon dioxide 
emissions, the coefficient of 0.39 translates into an increase in the loan spread by 6.5 bps.
11
 
For the 1,600 loans included in the sample, the average loan size is US$ 1.49 billion and 6.5 
bps thus amount to annual interest cost of US$ 0.97 million. Alternatively, an increase in 
                                                          
10
 This means that this analysis also includes firms that do not show up as borrowers in our regression samples. 
11
 To estimate this increase in spread, we compare predicted spreads when we vary carbon emissions by one 
standard deviation while setting all other independent variables to their mean. 
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Scope 1 carbon emissions from the 5
th
 to the 95
th
 percentile translates into a spread increase of 
9.5 bps or US$ 1.4 million.  
To provide a more complete picture, we find that the economic relevance of increases 
in Scope 2 and total carbon emissions (the sum of Scope 1 and Scope 2 emissions) is equally 
clear. Respectively, a one standard deviation increase in emissions translates into 5.7 bps 
(US$ 0.85 million) and 7.9 bps (US$ 1.2 million) while an increase from the 5
th
 to the 95
th
 
percentile translates into 8.3 bps (US$ 1.2 million) and 16.9 bps (US$ 2.5 million). Thus, our 
results obtained thus far are also economically significant.  
**** Insert Table 2 about here **** 
Second, we shed light on the Investor Preference Hypothesis in Table 3. In this Table, 
we control for the presence of norms-constrained arrangers (NCA) in two different ways. In 
Panel A, NCA is a binary variable which equals one if the loan has been arranged by at least 
one CDP signatory. In Panel B, NCA is measured as the fraction of CDP signatories of the 
entire arranger syndicate for this specific loan. In both Panels, we assess the influence of the 
actual carbon emissions and the interaction effect between carbon emissions and the presence 
of NCAs on the loan spreads borrowing companies have to pay.  
While the results indicate that the industry-adjusted level of carbon emissions 
significantly influences the loan spreads in a positive way, none of the interaction terms 
between the levels of carbon emissions and NCA is significant. These results are consistent 
across all models in Table 3 and allow us to reject the Investor Preference Hypothesis as it 
indicates that loans arranged by CDP signatories (i.e., by environmentally NCA) carry the 
same spread as loans arranged by unconstrained lenders. As before, the empirical results for 
the remaining control variables are consistent with the existing literature on loan pricing. 
As a whole, the results of Tables 2 and 3 support our Risk Mitigation Hypothesis: 
Firms with higher carbon emissions face a higher cost of debt capital. This seems to suggest 
that firms can save substantial amounts of capital by limiting their carbon emissions relative 
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to their industry peers. This benefit materializes independent of whether firms borrow from 
environmentally norms-constrained or -unconstrained lenders.   
**** Insert Table 3 about here **** 
4.3  Additional Evidence on the Risk Mitigation Hypothesis 
Having documented supporting evidence in favor of our Risk Mitigation Hypothesis, 
we spare out the analysis of the existence of NCAs in this robustness test section and rather 
focus on the risk mitigation story such as in Table 2. 
4.3.1  Which industries are mostly exposed to the risk mitigation effects? 
In our first additional analyses, we provide evidence on the industry variation of the 
empirical effects that we documented before. As we have documented in Figure 2, the extent 
to which industries are exposed to carbon emissions ultimately depends on the industry they 
are operating in. Therefore, this section sheds additional light on the claim that only 
environmentally sensitive industries are affected by substantial levels of carbon emissions. 
Furthermore, this additional analysis is also of great importance to investors and in particular 
lenders, as the industry is considered to be an important driver of corporate credit ratings and 
loan spreads.  
The analysis of this industry effect is presented in Table 4 and consists of four 
different Panels: Panel A takes into account manufacturing and construction companies, Panel 
B focuses on public utilities and transportation, Panel C includes mining and agriculture, 
forestry, and fishing, while Panel D takes into account companies from finance, insurance, 
and real estate. In these four panels, we pool industries with similar levels of median industry 
emissions. It is nevertheless important to note that due to our approach to look at specific 
industry subsets, the number of observations in each of the models is significantly lower than 
in the previous analyses which might also in turn affect the corresponding statistical power of 
these models.  
**** Insert Table 4 about here **** 
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The results of Table 4 can be interpreted as follows. To start with, we find consistently 
positive and mostly significant relations between the level of carbon emissions, in particular 
Scope 1 emissions, and the loan spreads. Only for Panel C, where we focus on the mining and 
agriculture, forestry, and fishing sectors, we are not able to establish a significant and positive 
relationship between the emission levels and the loan spreads.  
The overall results point to the fact that not only environmentally sensitive industries, 
i.e. those industries that are well-known to be highly exposed to climate change risks and 
carbon emissions, have to pay a premium on their bank loans when they exhibit relatively 
high carbon emission levels. Instead, we also show that companies operating in the finance, 
insurance, and real estate sectors have to pay a premium when their carbon emissions are 
relatively high. 
4.3.2  Quantile regression results: Are the biggest emitters driving our results? 
To account for the fact that even industry- and firm-size adjusted carbon emissions 
might be influenced by severe outliers (both at the upper and lower end of the distribution), 
we repeat the analyses that we conducted in Table 2 using a quantile regression approach with 
bootstrapped standard errors. This exercise can be regarded as a robustness check to rule out 
the possibility that the firms with the highest carbon emissions in our sample are driving the 
results that we obtained so far. The results in all three Panels indicate that the previously 
documented positive and significant relation between carbon emissions and loan spreads is 
consistent across the entire distributions of loan spreads and emissions, i.e., the size and 
significance of the carbon emission coefficients are remarkably similar across the distribution. 
An interesting observation can be made from Panels B and C in that the control variable 
accounting for the presence of a reputable arranger exhibits a negative and significant relation 
with a company‟s loan spread. This implies that loans arranged by reputable arrangers (which 
can also be NCAs) have lower loan spreads, but only for very reputable arrangers at the 50% 
or 75% reputation quantile. Similarly, loan maturity is negatively related to spreads only at 
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the long end of the maturity distribution, e.g. at the 75
th
 percentile. In contrast an 
improvement of borrower profitability is most strongly related to spreads for the weakest 
borrower, e.g.  borrowers with ROA at the 25
th
 percentile. 
**** Insert Table 5 about here **** 
4.3.3  Assessing the influence of a company’s control over carbon emissions on spreads 
Boards can exert direct control over the carbon emission levels of their companies. In 
order to do so, boards can put several measures in place which might influence the observed 
relationship between emission levels and loan spreads because the arrangers and other 
participating banks in the loan syndicate might take the company‟s level of awareness and 
control also into account when assessing the creditworthiness of a potential borrower. For 
example, in order to convince investors and other stakeholder about the board‟s awareness of 
climate change and carbon emissions, companies can externally verify the measurement and 
reporting of the emission levels through a third party such as an auditor. Alternatively, 
companies nowadays also put specific and measurable carbon emission reduction targets in 
place which outline the company‟s approach to reduce its long term carbon emission levels. 
The presence of such targets could thus signal the company‟s strong control over emission 
levels to investors. Yet another alternative is to introduce board-level responsibility for 
climate change and carbon emissions by appointing a Chief Sustainability Officer or by 
introducing a particular board-level committee which deals with sustainability and climate 
change questions.
12
   
The three different Panels in Table 6 take account of these options. In Panel A, we 
assess the impact of externally verifying the carbon emissions. Across all three models of 
Panel A we find a positive and significant relation between Scope 1, Scope 2, and total carbon 
emission and the loan spreads, but only for firms which have their carbon emissions not 
                                                          
12
 Such a committee would be similar in terms of functionality and responsibility as the audit or remuneration 
committee that most publicly listed companies have (or are required to have). 
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externally verified. These results can be interpreted as follows. Companies which have no 
external verification of their carbon emissions have to pay higher loan spreads when they 
exhibit higher levels carbon emissions. Because of the missing external validation of the 
reported carbon emissions, lenders charge a risk premium as borrowers seem to only have 
weak control over their emissions and lenders cannot be assured that the reported emission 
level reflect the actual amount of carbon emitted. On the other hand, borrowers which have 
their emission levels externally verified do not have to pay higher loan spreads even with 
relatively high emission levels.  
Panel B of Table 6 investigates the influence of the presence of company-wide 
emission reduction plans. For this Panel, we find a consistent positive relationship between 
the interaction term between the emission level and the binary variable which indicates the 
control level of a company and the loan spread. The positive coefficient on the interaction 
term implies that irrespective of whether the company has emission reduction targets in place 
or not, it has to pay significantly higher loan spreads when the emission level is high. 
However, the increase in spreads tends to be higher for borrowers with weak control over 
their emissions,i.e, borrowers without reduction targets.
13
 While consistent with our initial 
evidence on the risk mitigation hypothesis, these findings imply that targets specified in the 
reduction plans might be a valuable management tool to at least partially reduce the 
environmental risk premium charged by lenders. 
Panel C of Table 6 then goes on and takes a look whether board level responsibility for 
climate change and carbon emissions has a differentiating pricing effect for corporate bank 
loans. The results indicate that carbon emission have a positive relation with loan spreads, 
especially in the absence of board level responsibility for carbon emissions. That is, when 
companies do not have appropriate board-level responsibility in place, companies have to pay 
                                                          
13
 However, this increase is statistically significant only in Model 2 where the F-test of 3.32 indicates a 
significant difference between the interaction term coefficients at the 10% level.  
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significantly higher loan spreads as compared to companies which have explicit board level 
responsibility for climate change and carbon emissions. This result indicates that lenders 
value the presence of board-level responsibility for climate change and carbon emissions. 
5 Summary and concluding comments 
This paper analyses the effects of voluntarily disclosing carbon emissions and the 
actually revealed level of carbon emissions for the corporate cost of debt. The central research 
question is whether more transparency with respect to and disclosure of actual carbon 
emissions levels is related to a corporation‟s cost of debt in a significant way. Our results 
document that higher transparency with respect to carbon emissions leads to more favorable 
loan conditions: Firms which answer the annual CDP questionnaire and voluntarily reveal 
their carbon emission pay significantly lower loan spreads as compared to firms which do not 
disclose their emissions data. On average, firms that receive the CDP questionnaire and 
decide to disclose their emissions can save up to US$ 1.2 million per annum in interest 
payments. This is an economically significant amount. In our analyses, we also address the 
question whether the effect of carbon emissions disclosure is same for firms with different 
levels of information uncertainty. We find that voluntary disclosure of carbon emissions is 
limited to borrowers with a high level of information uncertainty 
In the second part of the paper, we focus on those CDP firms which also disclose their 
carbon emissions. To be more precise, we examine whether the actual level of carbon 
emissions affect the loan spread. Our analyses reveal that higher industry- and firm-size-
adjusted carbon emissions have a significantly positive effect on loan spreads.  Economically, 
we find that a one standard deviation increase in our relative carbon emissions measures can 
lead to an average increase in interest costs of US$ 0.85 to 1.2 million per annum. As this 
spread premium is unaffected by the presence of norms-constrained investors, we conclude in 
favor of the Risk Mitigation over the Investor Preference Hypothesis. 
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Our results suggest that financial markets and in particular for lenders take into 
account extra-financial information on firms‟ environmental performance when assessing the 
creditworthiness of borrowers because they are aware of potential future risks that can arise 
for firms with poor environmental performance. Furthermore, Our results suggest policy 
implication for firms and regulators. First, firms can mitigate this environmental risk premium 
by signaling their strong level of control over their environmental performance to lenders. 
External verification of carbon emissions, emission reduction targets and board-level 
responsibility for climate change and carbon emissions are valuable management tools in this 
respect. Second, the substantial size of the environmental risk premium provides firms with a 
strong incentive to reduce and manage their carbon emissions. For regulators and 
governments, such corporate self-regulation reduces – at least to some extent – the need for 
explicit regulation. 
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Appendix  
 
 
Table A1
Variable definitions and sources
Variable Definition and source
Dependent variable
Spread Loan spread above LIBOR in basis points. Source: DealScan, field "all in spread drawn".
CO 2  disclosure, emissions and control
Disclosure Dummy equal to 1 if borrower receives and answers questionnaire in year of loan signing, 0 otherwise.
Source: CDP.
No response Dummy equal to 1 if borrower receives questionnaire in year of loan signing but does not respond, 0
otherwise. Source: CDP.
Decline to disclose Dummy equal to 1 if borrower receives questionnaire in year of loan signing and declines to disclose any
information, 0 otherwise. This is the baseline category that is excluded from the regressions.Source: CDP.
CO2 scope 1 Tons of scope 1 CO2 emissions per 1 US dollar of assets of borrower relative to industry median
emissions and divided by 100. Borrower's emissions as reported in questionnaire send in year of loan
signing. Industry median emissions are based on CO2 emissions of all firms who report to CDP. Industries
correspond to industry dummies defined below. Source: CDP except assets of emitters and borrowers
which are obtained from Worldscope.
CO2 scope 2 As above but for scope 2 CO2 emissions.
CO2 scope 1 + 2 CO2 scope 1 + CO2 scope 2
CO2 controlstrong Dummy equal to 1 if borrower has strong control over CO2 emissions in year of loan signing, 0 otherwise.
Three different versions of this variable exist. Source: CDP.
Dummy equal to 1 if borrower's CO2 emissions are externally verified, 0 otherwise. 
Dummy equal to 1 if borrower has a CO2 reduction plan or target in place, 0 otherwise. 
Dummy equal to 1 if borrower places reponsibility for CO2 emissions at board level, 0 otherwise. 
CO2 controlweak 1 - CO2 controlstrong
Borrower characteristics
CDP target Dummy equal to 1 if borrower receives a questionnaire in year of loan signing, 0 otherwise. Source: CDP.
ROA Return on assets defined as net income divided by total assets in US dollar in year of loan signing. Source:
Worldscope, fields "Net Income (U.S.$) WC07250". And "Total Assets WC02999".
Leverage Total debt divided by total assets in US dollar in year of loan signing. Source: Worldscope, fields "Total
Debt WC03255" and "Total Assets WC02999".
Total assets Total assets in US dollar in year of loan signing. Source: Worldscope, field "Total Assets WC02999".
No financial statements Dummy equal to 1 if total assets are not available in year of loan signing. Source: Worldscope.
Rating dummies Dummies identifying borrower's senior debt rating: AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, CC, C, D and
Unrated. Source: DealScan, field "Ratings S&P Senior Debt at Close".
Opaque borrower Unrated * No financial statements.
Country dummies Dummies identifying borrower country. Source: DealScan, field "Borrower Country".
Dummies identifying borrower's industry based on SIC codes. Source: CDP. The following industries are
differentiated:
agriculture, forestry, fishing if 1<=SIC<1000
mining if 1000<=SIC<1500
construction if 1500<=SIC<1800
services if 7000<=SIC<9000
public administration if 9100<=SIC<10000
finance, insurance, real estate if 6000<=SIC<6800
trade if 5000<=SIC<6000
transportation if 4000<=SIC<4300 or 4400<= SIC<4600
public utilities if 4300<=SIC<4400 or 4600<=SIC<5000
manufacturing- other if 2000<=SIC<4000
manufacturing- chemicals if 2800<=SIC<2900
manufacturing- petrol refining if 2900<=SIC<3000
manufacturing- primary metal if 3300<=SIC<3400
(continued)
Industry dummies
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Table A1 (continued)
Variable definitions and sources
Variable Definition and source
Loan characteristics
Norms constrained 
arranger (NCA)
Dummy equal to 1 if at least one CDP signatory is among the loan's lead arrangers, 0 otherwise. Source:
CDP for signatories, DealScan for lead arrangers.
Reputable arranger Dummy equal to 1 if at least one arranger belongs to top 10 arrangers in terms of market share in the year
before loan signing. Source: Own calculations based on DealScan, field "Lead arranger", market shares
are based on loan size.
Loan maturity Tranche maturity in months. Source: DealScan, field "Tenor / Maturity".
Loan size Tranche size in US dollar. Source: DealScan, field "Tranche Size (Converted)".
Multiple-tranche deal Dummy equal to 1 if loan tranche belongs to deal with multiple tranches, 0 otherwise. Source: DealScan.
Performance pricing Dummy equal to 1 if loan contract includes performance pricing, 0 otherwise. Source: Dealscan, field
"Performance Pricing".
Financial covenants Dummy equal to 1 if loan contract includes financial covenants, 0 otherwise. Source: Dealscan, field
"Covenants Financial: All Covenants Financial".
Multiple base rates Dummy equal to 1 if loan contract includes multiple base rates, 0 otherwise. Source: Dealscan, field "Base
Rate / Margin".
Term loan Dummy equal to 1 if loan is term loan, 0 otherwise. Source: DealScan, fields "SpecificInstrument" and
"SpecificTrancheType"., 0 otherwise
Senior Dummy equal to 1 if loan is senior or senior subordinated, 0 otherwise. Source: DealScan, field "Seniority".
Secured Dummy equal to 1 if loan is secured, 0 otherwise. Source: DealScan, field "Secured / Unsecured".
Loan purpose dummies Dummies identifying different loan purposes: corporate restructuring, financial structure, general corporate
purpose, undisclosed. Source: DealScan, field "Primary Purpose".
Year dummies Dummies identifying different years of loan signing: 2007 to 2013. Source: DealScan, field "Deal Active
Date".
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Table A2
Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Median
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum N
Panel A: Sample of loans used in analyses of emission transparency
ln(spread in bp) 5.18 5.30 0.83 -0.51 7.60 17,643
Spread in bp 238.23 200.00 188.35 0.60 2,000.00 17,643
CDP target 0.28 0 0.45 0 1 17,643
Disclosure 0.17 0 0.37 0 1 17,643
No response 0.09 0 0.29 0 1 17,643
Decline to disclose 0.02 0 0.16 0 1 17,643
Unrated 0.55 1 0.50 0 1 17,643
No financial statements 0.49 0 0.50 0 1 17,643
Opaque 0.70 1 0.46 0 1 17,643
Norms constrained arranger 0.65 1 0.48 0 1 17,643
Reputable arranger 0.58 1 0.49 0 1 17,643
ln(Loan size in $) 18.99 19.11 1.50 11.51 24.62 17,643
Loan size in $ mio 497.00 200.00 1,100.00 0.10 49,000.00 17,643
ln(Loan maturity) 3.78 4.09 0.64 0.00 6.59 17,643
Loan maturity (months) 51.25 60.00 26.52 1.00 725.00 17,643
Multiple-tranche deal 0.55 1 0.50 0 1 17,643
Performance pricing 0.22 0 0.42 0 1 17,643
Financial covenants 0.37 0 0.48 0 1 17,643
Multiple base rates 0.25 0 0.43 0 1 17,643
Term loan 0.46 0 0.50 0 1 17,643
Senior 1.00 1 0.06 0 1 17,643
Secured 0.41 0 0.49 0 1 17,643
Panel B: Sample of loans used in analysis of CO2 emissions
ln(spread in bp) 4.79 4.91 0.88 0.00 7.03 1,600
Spread in bp 164.61 135.00 126.71 1.00 1,125.00 1,600
CO2 scope 1 0.05 0.01 0.14 0.00 1.12 1,600
CO2 scope 2 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.80 1,600
CO2 scope 1 + 2 0.08 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.28 1,600
CO2 controlstrong-externally verified emissions scope 1 0.50 0 0.50 0 1 1,600
CO2 controlstrong-externally verified emissions scope 2 0.39 0 0.49 0 1 1,600
CO2 controlstrong-externally verified emissions scope 1+2 0.39 0 0.49 0 1 1,600
CO2 controlstrong-reduction target or plan 0.74 1 0.44 0 1 1,600
CO2 controlstrong-board level reponsability 0.59 1 0.49 0 1 1,600
Norms constrained arranger 0.85 1 0.36 0 1 1,600
Reputable arranger 0.84 1 0.37 0 1 1,600
ln(Loan size in $) 20.41 20.50 1.26 15.93 24.62 1,600
Loan size in $ mio 1,490.00 800.00 2,360.00 8.25 49,000.00 1,600
ln(Loan maturity) 3.66 3.97 0.66 0.00 6.59 1,600
Loan maturity (months) 46.22 53.00 27.21 1.00 725.00 1,600
Multiple-tranche deal 0.47 0 0.50 0 1 1,600
Performance pricing 0.24 0 0.42 0 1 1,600
Financial covenants 0.28 0 0.45 0 1 1,600
Multiple base rates 0.16 0 0.37 0 1 1,600
Term loan 0.29 0 0.45 0 1 1,600
Senior 1.00 1 0.05 0 1 1,600
Secured 0.15 0 0.35 0 1 1,600
ROA 0.04 0.04 0.08 -0.71 0.77 1,600
Leverage 0.30 0.29 0.15 0.00 0.81 1,600
ln(Total assets in $ '000) 16.78 16.79 1.34 11.72 21.51 1,600
Total assets in $ bn 50.50 19.60 117.00 0.12 2,190.00 1,600
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Figure 1
Cost of debt for different borrower types
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Figure 2
Median CO2 emissions by industry group
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Table 1
Voluntary Disclosure
CO 2  disclosure
Disclosure -0.11 * -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
(-1.79) (-0.65) (-0.65) (-0.71)
No response -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07
(-1.30) (-1.27) (-1.27) (-1.23)
Disclosure * Opaque borrower -0.12 *** -0.14 * -0.10 **
(-3.01) (-1.72) (-2.20)
Disclosure * Opaque borrower * NCA 0.03
(0.32)
Borrower characteristics
CDP target -0.13 *** -0.05 -0.05 -0.05
(-6.63) (-0.84) (-0.82) (-0.81)
Unrated 1.11 *** 1.10 *** 1.14 *** 1.15 *** 1.16 ***
(5.18) (5.13) (5.27) (5.29) (5.06)
No financial statements 0.05 *** 0.05 *** 0.06 *** 0.06 *** 0.26 ***
(4.15) (4.18) (4.98) (4.98) (4.60)
Loan characteristics
Norms constrained arranger (NCA) -0.01
(-0.99)
Reputable arranger -0.12 *** -0.12 *** -0.12 *** -0.12 *** -0.10 ***
(-9.20) (-9.19) (-9.08) (-8.86) (-3.14)
ln(Loan size) -0.08 *** -0.08 *** -0.08 *** -0.08 *** -0.06 ***
(-14.67) (-14.61) (-14.65) (-14.47) (-5.12)
ln(Loan maturity) 0.03 ** 0.03 ** 0.03 ** 0.03 ** 0.05 *
(2.34) (2.25) (2.29) (2.29) (1.79)
Multiple-tranche deal 0.10 *** 0.10 *** 0.10 *** 0.10 *** 0.10 ***
(7.07) (7.08) (7.00) (7.06) (3.56)
Performance pricing -0.10 *** -0.10 *** -0.10 *** -0.10 *** -0.00
(-5.35) (-5.37) (-5.38) (-5.38) (-0.03)
Financial covenants -0.04 ** -0.04 ** -0.04 ** -0.04 ** 0.04
(-2.49) (-2.53) (-2.47) (-2.43) (1.02)
Multiple base rates -0.05 ** -0.05 ** -0.05 ** -0.05 ** 0.03
(-2.54) (-2.51) (-2.52) (-2.48) (0.73)
Term loan 0.23 *** 0.23 *** 0.22 *** 0.22 *** 0.11 ***
(19.75) (19.64) (19.56) (19.57) (3.91)
Senior -1.13 *** -1.12 *** -1.12 *** -1.12 *** -1.31 ***
(-12.42) (-12.37) (-12.38) (-12.37) (-5.62)
Secured 0.20 *** 0.20 *** 0.20 *** 0.20 *** 0.19 ***
(14.95) (14.98) (15.04) (15.05) (5.84)
Adjusted R-squared 0.584 0.585 0.585 0.585 0.607
Observations 17,643 17,643 17,643 17,643 5,017
Note: This table shows OLS regressions with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by borrower.
Regressions 1 to 4 are based on a sample of public firms, regression 5 is based on a sub-sample of public firms
that received a questionnaire from CDP in the year of loan signing. For each independent variable, the top row
shows the coefficient and the bottom row shows the t-statistic. All regressions include dummies for loan
characteristics including loan purpose and year of loan signing as well as borrower characteristics including
rating, industry and country. The excluded disclosure class is "Decline to disclose". The excluded rating class is
AAA. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.
ln(spread in bp)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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Table 2
Risk Mitigation
CO 2  emissions
CO2 scope 1 0.39 **
(2.39)
CO2 scope 2 0.66 ***
(3.63)
CO2 scope 1 + 2 0.38 ***
(3.40)
Borrower characteristics
ROA -0.63 ** -0.64 ** -0.66 **
(-2.12) (-2.07) (-2.23)
Leverage -0.01 -0.06 -0.06
(-0.07) (-0.41) (-0.40)
ln(Total assets) -0.10 *** -0.10 *** -0.10 ***
(-4.91) (-4.80) (-4.69)
Loan characteristics
Reputable arranger -0.13 ** -0.13 ** -0.13 **
(-2.49) (-2.53) (-2.51)
ln(Loan size) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-0.61) (-0.65) (-0.67)
ln(Loan maturity) -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(-0.84) (-0.80) (-0.80)
Multiple-tranche deal 0.09 ** 0.09 ** 0.09 **
(2.17) (2.17) (2.18)
Performance pricing 0.08 * 0.09 * 0.08 *
(1.66) (1.85) (1.65)
Financial covenants 0.03 0.04 0.04
(0.72) (0.93) (0.77)
Multiple base rates 0.01 -0.00 0.01
(0.22) (-0.06) (0.22)
Term loan 0.09 ** 0.09 ** 0.09 **
(2.12) (2.03) (2.08)
Senior -1.60 *** -1.62 *** -1.60 ***
(-2.94) (-2.97) (-2.95)
Secured 0.17 ** 0.17 ** 0.17 **
(2.50) (2.54) (2.58)
Adjusted R-squared 0.667 0.667 0.668
Observations 1,600 1,600 1,600
Note: This table shows OLS regressions with heteroscedasticity robust
standard errors clustered by borrower. For each independent variable,
the top row shows the coefficient and the bottom row shows the t-
statistic. All regressions include dummies for loan characteristics
including loan purpose and year of loan signing as well as borrower
characteristics including rating, industry and country. *** 1%, ** 5%, *
10% significance.
ln(spread in bp)
(1) (2) (3)
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Table 3
Risk Mitigation Versus Investor Preference 
CO 2  emissions
CO2 scope 1 0.52 ** 0.52 **
(2.04) (2.32)
CO2 scope 2 0.75 0.71 *
(1.32) (1.91)
CO2 scope 1 + 2 0.51 ** 0.51 ***
(2.39) (2.86)
CO2 scope 1 * NCA -0.15 -0.24
(-0.72) (-0.99)
CO2 scope 2 * NCA -0.09 -0.09
(-0.16) (-0.20)
(CO2 scope 1 + 2) * NCA -0.14 -0.21
(-0.71) (-1.07)
Borrower characteristics
ROA -0.64 ** -0.65 ** -0.67 ** -0.64 ** -0.64 ** -0.67 **
(-2.15) (-2.06) (-2.26) (-2.15) (-2.05) (-2.26)
Leverage -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.00 -0.06 -0.06
(-0.07) (-0.41) (-0.41) (-0.03) (-0.38) (-0.39)
ln(Total assets) -0.10 *** -0.10 *** -0.10 *** -0.10 *** -0.10 *** -0.10 ***
(-5.01) (-4.89) (-4.79) (-5.08) (-4.93) (-4.83)
Loan characteristics
Norms constrained arranger (NCA) 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.06
(0.40) (0.21) (0.39) (0.88) (0.65) (0.84)
Reputable arranger -0.13 ** -0.13 ** -0.13 ** -0.12 ** -0.13 ** -0.12 **
(-2.54) (-2.57) (-2.55) (-2.28) (-2.35) (-2.29)
ln(Loan size) -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-0.60) (-0.65) (-0.66) (-0.60) (-0.64) (-0.67)
ln(Loan maturity) -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(-0.89) (-0.82) (-0.85) (-0.86) (-0.80) (-0.83)
Multiple-tranche deal 0.08 ** 0.08 ** 0.08 ** 0.08 ** 0.08 ** 0.08 **
(2.13) (2.14) (2.15) (2.14) (2.14) (2.14)
Performance pricing 0.08 * 0.09 * 0.08 * 0.08 * 0.09 * 0.08
(1.67) (1.85) (1.65) (1.65) (1.84) (1.64)
Financial covenants 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04
(0.70) (0.93) (0.77) (0.71) (0.92) (0.78)
Multiple base rates 0.01 -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.01
(0.23) (-0.05) (0.23) (0.18) (-0.08) (0.19)
Term loan 0.09 ** 0.09 ** 0.09 ** 0.09 ** 0.09 ** 0.09 **
(2.12) (2.02) (2.07) (2.14) (2.04) (2.09)
Senior -1.60 *** -1.62 *** -1.61 *** -1.60 *** -1.62 *** -1.60 ***
(-2.94) (-2.97) (-2.94) (-2.89) (-2.93) (-2.90)
Secured 0.17 ** 0.17 ** 0.17 ** 0.16 ** 0.17 ** 0.17 **
(2.51) (2.53) (2.58) (2.49) (2.53) (2.56)
Adjusted R-squared 0.667 0.667 0.668 0.667 0.667 0.668
Observations 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600
Note: This table shows OLS regressions with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by borrower. In Panel
A, NCA is measured with a dummy variable which is set to 1 if at least one of the loan's arrangers is a CDP signatory, 0
otherwise. In Panel B, NCA is measured as the fraction of CDP signatories among the loan's arrangers. For each
independent variable, the top row shows the coefficient and the bottom row shows the t-statistic. All regressions include
dummies for loan characteristics including loan purpose and year of loan signing as well as borrower characteristics
including rating, industry and country. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.
Panel A: Presence of norms 
constraint arrangers
Panel B: Prominance of norms 
constraint arrangers
ln(spread in bp)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
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Table 4
Industry level analysis
CO 2  emissions
CO2 scope 1 0.62 *** 0.99 ** -1.89 1.18 ***
(3.37) (2.12) (-0.69) (5.24)
CO2 scope 2 1.20 0.61 * 1.26 0.76 **
(1.41) (1.78) (0.78) (2.36)
CO2 scope 1 + 2 0.54 *** 0.81 *** 0.33 0.76 ***
(3.31) (3.16) (0.23) (4.49)
Borrower characteristics
ROA -0.89 * -0.85 * -0.90 * -1.42 ** -1.59 ** -1.46 ** -0.53 -0.67 * -0.66 * -0.33 0.09 -0.87
(-1.92) (-1.68) (-1.92) (-2.06) (-2.25) (-2.11) (-1.63) (-1.92) (-1.99) (-0.29) (0.07) (-0.81)
Leverage -0.38 -0.35 -0.38 -0.41 -0.46 * -0.45 * 0.69 0.61 0.56 0.52 *** 0.26 0.24
(-1.56) (-1.42) (-1.57) (-1.60) (-1.81) (-1.78) (1.21) (1.19) (1.05) (2.71) (1.12) (1.40)
ln(Total assets) -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.09 * -0.11 ** -0.09 * -0.11 -0.09 -0.09 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01
(-1.13) (-1.20) (-1.11) (-1.86) (-2.30) (-1.95) (-1.20) (-0.93) (-1.01) (-0.04) (-0.49) (-0.17)
Loan characteristics
Reputable arranger -0.15 * -0.15 * -0.15 * -0.12 -0.12 -0.11 -0.12 -0.10 -0.10 -0.21 -0.18 -0.18
(-1.93) (-1.92) (-1.95) (-1.01) (-1.02) (-0.94) (-1.48) (-1.22) (-1.27) (-1.60) (-1.31) (-1.36)
ln(Loan size) -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.10 * 0.10 * 0.10 * -0.03 -0.07 * -0.04
(-1.12) (-1.07) (-1.13) (1.13) (1.24) (1.16) (1.89) (1.92) (1.96) (-0.93) (-1.82) (-1.24)
ln(Loan maturity) -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.06 0.07 0.06
(-1.34) (-1.34) (-1.29) (0.29) (0.16) (0.27) (-0.44) (-0.48) (-0.50) (1.44) (1.46) (1.32)
Multiple-tranche deal 0.11 * 0.11 0.11 * 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.17 ** 0.18 ** 0.17 ** 0.04 0.10 0.07
(1.69) (1.64) (1.68) (1.02) (0.75) (0.74) (2.14) (2.25) (2.19) (0.56) (1.16) (1.00)
Performance pricing 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.28 *** 0.29 *** 0.29 *** 0.27 * 0.27 * 0.27 * -0.21 0.15 -0.04
(0.25) (0.44) (0.25) (3.35) (3.26) (3.46) (1.90) (2.01) (1.94) (-1.23) (0.93) (-0.25)
Financial covenants -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 -0.20 * -0.06 -0.13
(-0.14) (-0.06) (-0.12) (0.94) (1.07) (1.00) (1.11) (1.16) (1.14) (-1.82) (-0.63) (-1.25)
Multiple base rates 0.13 0.11 0.12 -0.22 * -0.24 ** -0.22 * -0.16 -0.17 -0.16 0.22 -0.25 * -0.03
(1.62) (1.47) (1.58) (-1.80) (-2.01) (-1.87) (-1.02) (-1.06) (-1.02) (1.40) (-1.87) (-0.18)
Term loan 0.15 ** 0.14 ** 0.15 ** 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.21 * 0.22 ** 0.22 ** -0.29 *** -0.24 * -0.31 **
(2.59) (2.37) (2.54) (1.39) (1.40) (1.39) (1.96) (2.09) (2.15) (-2.74) (-1.96) (-2.66)
Senior -2.67 *** -2.69 *** -2.67 *** -0.55 * -0.58 ** -0.56 **
(-5.76) (-5.87) (-5.78) (-2.01) (-2.30) (-2.17)
Secured 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.30 ** 0.31 ** 0.31 ** 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.25 ** 0.18 * 0.27 ***
(0.60) (0.57) (0.56) (2.04) (2.06) (2.10) (1.06) (1.17) (1.10) (2.64) (1.97) (3.36)
Adjusted R-squared 0.724 0.721 0.724 0.689 0.687 0.690 0.792 0.792 0.790 0.813 0.793 0.813
Observations 724 724 724 308 308 308 132 132 132 180 180 180
Note: This table shows OLS regressions with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by borrower. For each independent variable, the top row shows the coefficient and
the bottom row shows the t-statistic. All regressions include dummies for loan characteristics including loan purpose and year of loan signing as well as borrower characteristics
including rating, industry and country. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.
Panel D: Finance, insurance, real 
estate
(1) (2)(2) (3)
Panel C: Mining & agriculture, 
forestry, fishing
ln(spread in bp)
(3) (3)(3)
Panel B: Public utilities & 
transportation
Panel A: Manufacturing & 
construction
(1) (1) (2)(1) (2)
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Table 5
Quantile analysis of CO2 emissions and the cost of debt
CO 2  emissions
CO2 scope 1 0.30 ** 0.31 ** 0.38 **
(2.09) (2.01) (2.26)
CO2 scope 2 0.60 *** 0.46 ** 0.50 ***
(4.23) (2.43) (2.59)
CO2 scope 1 + 2 0.33 *** 0.33 *** 0.36 ***
(3.52) (2.97) (3.85)
Borrower characteristics
ROA -1.10 *** -0.99 *** -0.98 *** -0.78 *** -0.81 *** -0.83 *** -0.49 ** -0.52 *** -0.55 ***
(-4.80) (-4.71) (-4.16) (-4.91) (-6.14) (-5.17) (-2.56) (-3.06) (-3.06)
Leverage 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.04 -0.02 0.07 0.06 0.02
(0.13) -0.48 -0.33 (0.83) (0.29) (-0.13) (0.56) -0.47 -0.19
ln(Total assets) -0.09 *** -0.10 *** -0.09 *** -0.08 *** -0.08 *** -0.08 *** -0.07 *** -0.08 *** -0.07 ***
(-4.84) (-5.43) (-4.94) (-5.24) (-5.06) (-4.81) (-3.72) (-4.05) (-3.33)
Loan characteristics
Reputable arranger -0.03 -0.06 -0.04 -0.08 * -0.09 * -0.09 ** -0.13 *** -0.12 ** -0.14 **
(-0.71) (-1.35) (-0.88) (-1.96) (-1.93) (-2.08) (-2.59) (-2.22) (-2.48)
ln(Loan size) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(0.25) (-0.00) (-0.00) (0.25) (-0.00) (-0.00) (-0.76) (-0.89) (-1.08)
ln(Loan maturity) 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.06 ** -0.05 * -0.06 **
(0.04) 0.00 (-0.07) (-0.81) (-1.03) (-0.71) (-2.23) (-1.76) (-2.23)
Multiple-tranche deal 0.04 0.07 ** 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 * 0.06 0.05 0.06
(1.30) -1.97 -1.58 (1.61) (1.55) -1.67 (1.41) -1.16 -1.50
Performance pricing 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.07 * 0.05
(1.01) -0.73 -0.33 (1.12) (0.90) -1.10 (1.29) -1.73 -1.18
Financial covenants 0.06 * 0.07 * 0.06 * 0.07 ** 0.07 ** 0.06 * 0.00 0.00 0.01
(1.65) -1.71 -1.68 (1.96) (2.27) -1.66 (0.09) (-0.04) -0.29
Multiple base rates 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.05
(0.07) (-0.42) -0.30 (-0.29) (-0.47) (-0.09) (1.16) -0.63 -0.99
Term loan 0.08 ** 0.09 ** 0.09 ** 0.09 ** 0.09 ** 0.09 *** 0.12 *** 0.09 ** 0.12 ***
(2.15) -2.54 -2.26 (2.46) (2.56) -2.64 (3.02) -1.99 -3.17
Senior -0.69 -1.22 -0.71 -2.65 *** -2.63 *** -2.60 *** -2.05 *** -2.03 *** -2.03 ***
(-0.63) (-1.27) (-0.63) (-2.71) (-2.66) (-2.61) (-3.12) (-2.79) (-2.87)
Secured 0.12 ** 0.09 0.11 * 0.14 *** 0.13 ** 0.15 *** 0.15 *** 0.14 *** 0.15 ***
(2.11) -1.40 -1.82 (2.64) (2.50) -2.89 (2.98) -3.00 -3.01
Pseudo R-squared 0.545 0.546 0.546 0.481 0.481 0.482 0.438 0.438 0.439
Observations 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600
Note: This table shows quantile regressions with bootstrapped standard errors. For each independent variable, the top row shows the coefficient and the
bottom row shows the t-statistic. All regressions include dummies for loan characteristics including loan purpose and year of loan signing as well as
borrower characteristics including rating, industry and country. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.
ln(spread in bp)
Panel A: 25% quantile Panel B: 50% quantile Panel C: 75% quantile
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
37 
 
 
 
Table 6
Borrower's control over emissions
CO 2  emissions
CO2 scope 1 * CO2 controlstrong 0.18 0.37 ** 0.23
(1.17) (2.32) (1.52)
CO2 scope 1 * CO2 controlweak 0.71 *** 0.65 0.78 **
(2.69) (1.29) (2.43)
CO2 scope 2 * CO2 controlstrong 0.39 0.55 *** 0.39
(1.41) (3.00) (1.43)
CO2 scope 2 * CO2 controlweak 0.79 *** 1.09 *** 0.80 ***
(4.09) (3.61) (4.16)
CO2 scope 1 + 2 * CO2 controlstrong 0.16 0.35 *** 0.22 *
(1.21) (3.24) (1.92)
CO2 scope 1 + 2 * CO2 controlweak 0.50 *** 0.69 *** 0.59 ***
(4.05) (2.73) (3.64)
Borrower characteristics
Loan characteristics
Adjusted R-squared 0.668 0.667 0.669 0.667 0.667 0.668 0.668 0.667 0.669
Observations 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600 1,600
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes yes
yes yes
yes
(1) (2) (3)
Note: This table shows OLS regressions with heteroscedasticity robust standard errors clustered by borrower. For each independent variable, the top row shows
the coefficient and the bottom row shows the t-statistic. All regressions include dummies for loan characteristics including loan purpose and year of loan signing
as well as borrower characteristics including rating, industry and country. *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10% significance.
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
ln(spread in bp)
Panel A: CO2 control measured via 
external verification of emissions
Panel B: CO2 Control measured via 
existence of emission reduction 
target or plan
Panel C: CO2 Control measured via 
responsibility for emissions at board 
level
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
